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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 James Edward Snapp appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, 
claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
Officer Brian Jones initiated a traffic stop after he saw Snapp speeding.  
(Tr.1, p.22, L.6 – p.25, L.7.)  Snapp did not immediately stop, but instead he 
continued to travel down a “really long driveway.”  (Tr., p.28, Ls.11-23.)  As 
Snapp “continu[ed] down the driveway,” “he started to open his driver’s side 
door.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.5-12.)  Officer Jones followed Snapp’s vehicle, “trying to get 
it to stop.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.16-17.)  Snapp eventually stopped after pulling “up close 
to [a] house.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.18-21.)  Before Snapp stopped, Officer Jones saw 
Snapp “throw something from the vehicle.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-25, p.30, Ls.12-16.)  
In Officer Jones’ experience, “when people have thrown things on [him], it’s been 
contraband or evidence of a crime.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-14.)   
Snapp denied throwing anything from his car, but a search of the area 
revealed a black bag with a “white, crystal shard substance” inside, which was 
                                            
1 As with the Appellant’s Brief, all “Tr.” references herein are to the transcript of 
the suppression hearing held on June 27, 2016; however, the state notes that the 
transcript references in the district court’s memorandum decision are to the 
preliminary hearing transcript (R., pp.55-57), which transcript does not appear to 
be included in the record on appeal.  
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later identified as “about a quarter pound of methamphetamine.”  (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.18-22, p.31, L.15 – p.34, L.5, p.37, Ls.11-24; R., p.57.)  The state charged 
Snapp with trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine.  (R., pp.10-11, 
24-25.)  Snapp filed a motion to suppress seeking suppression of “any and all 
evidence and statements, admissions, and/or confessions made by and/or 
attributed to [him] that were obtained as the result of the unlawful traffic stop.”  
(R., p.33.)  In his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Snapp 
argued he was entitled to suppression because, he asserted, Officer Jones 
abandoned the original purpose for the stop and unlawfully conducted a 
warrantless search of his property.  (R., pp.39-40.)  
The district court held a hearing on Snapp’s motion after which it entered a 
written decision denying Snapp’s request for suppression.  (R., pp.55-63.)  
Specifically, the district court concluded Officer Jones (1) had reasonable 
suspicion to abandon the original purpose of the traffic stop, (2) could “find and 
seize the back bag” under the plain view exception, and (3) could search the 
black bag because “Snapp relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding the contents of the bag” because he “denied tossing the bag out of the 
door,” and “thereby denied ownership of the bag.”  (R., pp.60-63.)   
On the day set for trial, Snapp entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
trafficking charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  (R., pp.71-83, 86-87.)  The district court imposed a unified seven-year 
sentence, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.98-99.)  Snapp filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp.100-102.)   
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ISSUE 
 Snapp states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Snapp’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)   
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Snapp failed to establish the district court erred in concluding that 
Snapp was not entitled to suppression of the methamphetamine he abandoned 
by throwing it in his yard when the officer was attempting to initiate a traffic stop?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Snapp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Snapp contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because, he argues, “the search of the curtilage of his residence, and the seizure 
(and resulting search) of the black bag” of methamphetamine he threw from his 
car when Officer Jones was attempting to initiate a traffic stop “were unlawful.”2  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-22.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the facts 
shows the district court correctly concluded Snapp was not entitled to 
suppression.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated:  when a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
 
C. Snapp Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His 
Suppression Motion 
 
 Snapp contends he was entitled to suppression of the methamphetamine 
found in the black bag he threw from his car onto “the curtilage of his residence” 
                                            
2 Snapp does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Officer Jones did 
not unlawfully prolong the stop.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-22.) 
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as Officer Jones was attempting to initiate a traffic stop.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-
22.)  This is so, Snapp claims, because the open view doctrine, the plain view 
exception, and the abandoned property exception do not apply to the facts of his 
case.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-22.)  Snapp is incorrect.  The district court correctly 
concluded that application of Fourth Amendment principles did not warrant 
suppression in this case.     
“‘The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  The 
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it 
merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.’”  State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 
265, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991)).  Thus, suppression is only warranted where the search or seizure is 
constitutionally unreasonable.  Id.; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 
(2016) (quotations, citations and ellipses omitted) (“Suppression of evidence has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse” because application of the 
exclusionary rule is only warranted “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 
substantial societal costs.”); State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 
212 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted) (recognizing that although warrantless 
searches are presumptively unreasonable, the presumption may be overcome “if 
the search falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or 
was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances”).  Both the seizure of the 
black bag of methamphetamine, and the search of that bag comported with 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements.     
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1. Officer Jones’ Entry Onto Snapp’s Property For The Purpose Of 
Seizing The Black Bag Of Methamphetamine He Saw Snapp Throw 
From His Car Was Constitutionally Reasonable 
 
“Under the open view doctrine, a police officer’s observations made from a 
location open to the public do not constitute a search.  This is because one 
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is knowingly exposed to 
public view.”  State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 
(1998) (citations omitted).  “[W]hen the police come onto private property to 
conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their 
movements to places where ordinary visitors could be expected to go, 
observations from such vantage points are lawful.”  State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 
112, 115, 175 P.3d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).  “Direct access 
routes to the house, including driveways, parking areas, and pathways to the 
entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly invited.”  Id.  “Police officers 
restricting their activity to such areas are permitted the same intrusion and the 
same level of observation as would be expected from a reasonably respectful 
citizen.”  Id.  “Only a substantial and unreasonable departure from the normal 
access routes will exceed the scope of the implied invitation and intrude upon 
constitutionally protected privacy interests.”  State v. Heibert, 156 Idaho 637, 
644, 329 P.3d 1085, 1092 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 232-233, 923 P.2d 469, 477-478 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(considering “whether the officer acted secretly, approached the house in 
daylight, attempted to talk with the resident,” and whether discovery is 
“accidental[ ]” as factors relevant to analysis under open view doctrine).  “[T]he 
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plain view exception applies to warrantless seizures of readily visible items.”  
Christensen, 131 Idaho at 146, 953 P.2d at 586.     
Officer Jones’ entry onto Snapp’s property in order to seize the bag of 
methamphetamine he saw Snapp throw from his moving car did not constitute a 
“substantial and unreasonable departure from the normal access route” under 
the facts of this case.  As Officer Jones was attempting to initiate a traffic stop on 
the car Snapp was driving, Snapp opened the car door and threw “a dark-colored 
squarish-type object” from his moving car.  (Tr., p.28, L.16 – p.30, L.4.)  Officer 
Jones “saw the general vicinity where [Snapp] threw” the object, but “didn’t see 
exactly where it landed.”  (Tr., p.30, Ls.8-11.)  Officer Jones testified that, in his 
experience, when he sees someone throw something when he is trying to initiate 
a traffic stop, “it’s been contraband or evidence of a crime.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-14; 
see also p.46, L.23 – p.47, L.8.)  Consequently, Officer Jones, with the 
assistance of other officers, looked for the object in the area where Officer Jones 
saw Snapp throw it.  (Tr., p.31, L.24 – p.32, L.11.)  That area was “kind of up 
towards the house in the corner area” which “was kind of a yard” with “weeds and 
objects and stuff.”  (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-18.)  Officer Jones began looking at a point 
about “10 feet” from the house, and then moved toward the house where he 
eventually found the object “about a foot away from the house,” and “about three 
feet off of the pathway” that leads to the house.  (Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33, L.25.)  
Officer Jones seized the bag at that time.  (See Tr., p.46, Ls.19-22, p.48, Ls.7-17, 
p.49, Ls.11-18.)  In doing so, Officer Jones did not substantially or unreasonably 
depart from the normal access route.  Although Officer Jones was not on the 
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pathway to the home when he seized the bag of methamphetamine, his 
movements were restricted to the area where the bag was thrown, and his 
departure from the pathway was neither substantial nor unreasonable.  Snapp 
has failed to show otherwise.     
Moreover, Snapp’s conduct invited Officer Jones to move beyond the 
implied invitation to “normal access route[s].”  State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 
155 P.3d 1157 (2007), is instructive.  In Jenkins, law enforcement received a 
report that Jenkins had committed a battery.  143 Idaho at 919, 155 P.3d at 
1158.  An officer attempted to stop Jenkins as he pulled into his driveway.  Id.  
Rather than stopping in the driveway, Jenkins opened his garage door and pulled 
inside.  Id.  The officer exited his patrol car, and went inside the garage to talk to 
Jenkins about the battery.  Id. at 919-920, 155 P.3d at 1158-1159.  “[B]ecause 
Jenkins smelled of alcohol, [the officer] conducted field sobriety tests,” and the 
state ultimately charged Jenkins with battery and driving under the influence.  Id. 
at 920, 155 P.3d at 1159.  Jenkins sought to suppress the evidence obtained 
during the investigation inside his garage “on the grounds that it was obtained 
through a warrantless entry into his private garage.”  Id.  Although the Court of 
Appeals concluded that, “[o]n the facts of th[e] case, Jenkins had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his temporarily opened and attached garage,” it held 
that, because the officer had probable cause to arrest Jenkins, “Jenkins could not 
thwart the arrest . . . by fleeing inside.”  Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 922, 155 P.3d at 
1161 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)).   
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Similarly, Snapp could not thwart the discovery of contraband in his 
possession by throwing it in his yard.  Like the officer in Jenkins, Officer Jones 
had probable cause to believe that Snapp violated the law.  Specifically, Officer 
Jones had probable cause to believe Snapp was in possession of contraband 
and that he was trying to conceal that evidence when he threw it from his car 
after Officer Jones attempted to stop him.  See I.C. § 37-2732 (possession of a 
controlled substance); I.C. § 18-2603 (concealing or destroying evidence); 
compare State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 576, 287 P.3d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(noting Loman’s evasive actions to discard his coat by throwing it inside a car 
when stopped by law enforcement “gave rise to probable cause to believe that 
the coat contained drugs or some other contraband that Loman rather 
desperately wanted to keep away from the officer” and upholding search of coat 
under automobile exception).  Officer Jones’ limited entry onto Snapp’s property 
in order to seize the bag of methamphetamine Snapp threw from his car did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.   
 
2. Officer Jones’ Search Of The Black Bag Snapp Abandoned By 
Throwing It From His Moving Car Did Not Violate The Fourth 
Amendment 
 
“There can be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation” or 
search “of abandoned property.”  Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 
(1960).  “One who voluntarily abandons property prior to [a] search cannot be 
said to possess the requisite privacy interest” under the Fourth Amendment.  
State v. Ross, 160 Idaho 757, 759, 378 P.3d 1056, 1058 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing 
Abel, supra).  “Abandonment, in the Fourth Amendment context, occurs through 
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words, acts, and other objective facts indicating that the defendant voluntarily 
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his or her interest in his or her 
property.”  Ross, 160 Idaho at 759-760, 378 P.3d at 1058-1059 (citing State v. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999)).  “If the 
abandonment is caused by illegal police conduct, however, the abandonment is 
not voluntary.”  Ross, 160 Idaho at 760, 378 P.3d at 1059 (citation omitted).     
Snapp abandoned his black bag of methamphetamine by throwing it out 
the window of his car and subsequently denying that he did so because his 
words and actions indicate that he “voluntarily discarded, left behind, or 
otherwise relinquished” any interest in the bag.  (Tr., p.29, L.5 – p.30, L.22.)  The 
district court correctly concluded as much.  (R., p.63 (“[B]ecause Snapp denied 
tossing the bag out of the door, he thereby denied ownership of the bag” and, 
“[b]y doing so, Snapp relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding the contents of the bag.”).)        
On appeal, Snapp argues he “did not abandon the black bag, because he 
did not disclaim ownership, and he threw it onto his own private property.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)  In making this assertion, Snapp claims that, “[j]ust 
because one denies throwing an item does not mean one necessarily also 
denies ownership of that item.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)  This argument ignores 
the relevant test, which allows consideration of a suspect’s words, actions, and 
other objective facts evidencing an intent to discard, leave behind, or otherwise 
relinquish ownership in property.  That standard was satisfied in this case.   
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Snapp also argues that he did not abandon his bag of methamphetamine 
because he threw the bag “into his own private property.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.17.)  Thus, Snapp reasons, he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the bag because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy on his property.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)  This argument fails to the extent it is based on the false 
premise that one cannot abandon a piece of personal property so long as the 
personal property rests on real property one does not abandon.  Such an 
argument does not make logical or legal sense.  To accept Snapp’s argument 
would mean that someone could leave a bag of methamphetamine in Snapp’s 
house, and Snapp could not disclaim ownership of it even if it did not belong to 
him.  Such a result defies logic and is surely one society would not be willing to 
accept.   
Snapp’s argument also ignores the legal standard for abandonment, which 
merely requires “words, acts, and other objective facts indicating that the 
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his or her 
interest in his or her property.”  Ross, 160 Idaho at 759, 378 P.3d at 1058.  
Nothing in this standard requires showing voluntary relinquishment of an 
ownership interest only while on public property.  Nevertheless, Snapp notes that 
“courts in some other jurisdictions have indicated one cannot abandon an item on 
one’s own property.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-18 (citing Work v. United States, 
243 F.2d 660, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1957), State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2007), and Brown v. State, 540 A.2d 143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).)  
The Court should decline to consider this argument because it is not preserved 
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since Snapp never claimed in district court that “one cannot abandon an item on 
one’s own property.”  (See generally R., pp.33-34, 37-41 (motion to suppress and 
supporting memorandum); Tr., p.50, L.20 – p.55, L.10, p.62, L.14 – p.64, L.25 
(argument at suppression hearing).)  See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 2017 WL 
2569786 *3, --- P.3d --- (Idaho 2017) (“We decline to adopt a ‘wrong result-wrong 
theory’ approach to reverse a lower court’s decision based on issues neither 
raised nor argued below.”).   
Even if considered, Snapp’s reliance on Work, Reed, and Brown is 
unavailing.  In Work, the court held the challenged evidence, which the defendant 
concealed in a trash can after officers illegally entered her home, must be 
suppressed because the concealment was the direct consequence of the 
officers’ “unlawful entry.”  243 F.2d at 661-662.  In other words, the concealment 
was not a voluntary abandonment, but was the product of illegal police conduct.  
Because Snapp’s abandonment was not the product of “illegal police conduct,” 
Work does not support Snapp’s claim.  
In Reed, officers contacted the defendant on his patio and requested a 
DNA sample, which he declined to provide.  641 S.E.2d at 321.  The officers, 
however, obtained the sample regardless of the defendant’s lack of consent after 
they kicked one of the defendant’s cigarette butts into the common area.  Id.  The 
officers thereafter retrieved the cigarette and submitted it for testing.  Id.  The 
court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy on his 
patio and that the search and seizure of the cigarette was unconstitutional 
because the cigarette was not abandoned.  The court explained: “It is possible 
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that had defendant placed the cigarette butt in the common area, he may have 
lost his reasonable expectation of privacy; the police may not, however, by 
removing evidence from the curtilage, proceed as if the evidence had been left 
open to the public by the defendant.”  Id. at 323.  Since Officer Jones did not 
surreptitiously remove the black bag from Snapp’s property or force Snapp’s 
abandonment of the bag, Reed does not support Snapp’s argument.  
Brown also does not support Snapp’s argument.  In Brown, officers went 
to the defendant’s home to investigate a report that he was dealing and 
manufacturing PCP.  540 A.2d at 145.  After the defendant failed to answer the 
door when the officers knocked, one officer went to the rear of the residence 
where he saw someone stick his hand through the window and throw something 
out.  Id. at 146.  The officers then searched the area inside the defendant’s 
fenced yard3 and found the items thrown from the window; those items were 
packets of PCP-laced parsley.  Id.  The court held there was no abandonment 
because the property “remained physically located in an area where [defendant] 
not only retained dominion but also had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”  Id. 
at 150.  Unlike in Brown, where the defendant secretly sought to dispose of his 
drugs in an enclosed backyard, Snapp threw his bag of drugs while Officer Jones 
was pursuing him, and then denied doing so.  Snapp’s words and actions, and 
the objective facts surrounding those words and actions, present a typical 
                                            
3 Unlike a fenced backyard, with respect to the “front door area,” the court in 
Brown stated that, “although within the curtilage area,” it was “entitled to 
extremely limited Fourth Amendment protection because Brown could not 
reasonably expect a great amount of privacy in an area where the public was 
welcome.”  540 A.2d at 149.  
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abandonment scenario.  Snapp has failed to show error in the district court’s 
conclusion that “Snapp relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding the contents of the bag.”  (R., p.63.)                 
Officer Jones’ actions were not arbitrary, and Snapp had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bag of methamphetamine he threw from his car.  
See Rios, 160 Idaho at 264-265, 371 P.3d at 318-319 (quotations and citation 
omitted) (the Fourth Amendment “protect[s] Idaho citizens’ reasonable 
expectation[s] of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion”).  
Consequently, Snapp has failed to show the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Snapp’s conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and/or 
amphetamine. 
 DATED this 13th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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